University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ASC)

Annenberg School for Communication

2013

Reflections On Hearing The Other Side, In Theory And In Practice
Diana Mutz
Annenberg School for Communication, mutz@upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers
Part of the Communication Commons

Recommended Citation
Mutz, D. (2013). Reflections On Hearing The Other Side, In Theory And In Practice. Critical Review, 25 (2),
260-276. https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2013.852346

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/626
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Reflections On Hearing The Other Side, In Theory And In Practice
Abstract
In response to my book’s finding that there is a tradeoff between two apparently desirable traits—a
propensity to participate in politics, on the one hand, and to expose oneself to disagreeable political ideas,
on the other—symposium participants suggest a number of reasons why this tradeoff should not trouble
participatory democratic theorists. One argument is that electoral advocacy (the type of participation I
measure) is not an important form of participation anyway, so we are better off without it. However, those
people who do not vote also tend not to participate in politics in other ways, so electoral advocacy is the
lowest possible bar for defining participation. Partisans are also more likely to be well informed and to
offer coherent reasons for their political preferences. A second argument suggests that deliberative
theorists have somewhat contradictory views of social influence, encouraging it in the context of
deliberative encounters but perceiving it as pernicious when members of political parties influence their
members. A third response is to posit a division of labor between closed-minded partisan advocates and
open-minded people who are exposed to cross-cutting debate. However, it is difficult to see how the
benefits of cross-cutting exposure will be conveyed to the advocates who participate in meaningful ways.
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ABSTRACT: In response to my book’s finding that there is a tradeoff between two apparently desirable
traits—a propensity to participate in politics, on the one hand, and to expose oneself to disagreeable
political ideas, on the other—symposium participants suggest a number of reasons why this tradeoff
should not trouble participatory democratic theorists. One argument is that electoral advocacy (the type
of participation I measure) is not an important form of participation anyway, so we are better off without
it. However, those people who do not vote also tend not to participate in politics in other ways, so
electoral advocacy is the lowest possible bar for defining participation. Partisans are also more likely to be
well informed and to offer coherent reasons for their political preferences. A second argument suggests
that deliberative theorists have somewhat contradictory views of social influence, encouraging it in the
context of deliberative encounters but perceiving it as pernicious when members of political parties
influence their members. A third response is to posit a division of labor between closed-minded partisan
advocates and open-minded people who are exposed to cross-cutting debate. However, it is difficult to see
how the benefits of cross-cutting exposure will be conveyed to the advocates who participate in
meaningful ways.

My first reaction to the set of essays in this volume was to be extremely flattered to have
such a distinguished group of scholars read my book, let alone take the time to reflect so
thoughtfully on its arguments. It is also quite gratifying to learn that my thoughts have influenced
scholars outside of my immediate subfield. Because my work since Hearing the Other Side (2006) has
been focused on mass media more than face-to-face communication, I have been remiss in following
much of the recent writing on deliberative theory. I welcome the opportunity to reconsider my ideas in
light of new developments.
These five essays raise many interesting points, more than I can possibly do justice to in a short
response, so I have singled out for comment what I find to be the most provocative and potentially
fruitful avenues for future work combining political theory with empirical research. I begin by focusing
on the perspectives on political participation offered by these essays. Next, I discuss whether a division
of labor between deliberators and activists is likely to be an effective solution to the underlying tension I
first identified in Hearing the Other Side. Finally, I offer my opinions on the most promising avenues for
increasing crosscutting exposure in the future.
Berger’s description of the “accidental theorist” is quite fitting in my case. I did not set out to
make a contribution to political theory and I am not trained as a normative theorist. I started from a
general interest in and enthusiasm for deliberative theory, and a desire to test empirically some of the
benefits that had been claimed to flow from deliberative encounters. Because I found definitions of
deliberation highly inconsistent across scholars and overly complex for purposes of empirical research, I
narrowed my focus to one essential component of deliberation: the extent to which people are exposed
to cross-cutting political views. I examined potential benefits that logically might accrue from this
particular aspect of deliberation.
For me, this collection of essays highlights further important discrepancies between political
theorists’ assumptions about mass political behavior and the realities suggested by empirical studies of
political behavior. In this sense, it is extremely gratifying to see the conversation between theorists and
empiricists continue. An end to that conversation is surely less desirable than a continuation, even if it is
one without a resolution.

Political Participation as Partisan Advocacy
In his essay, Ben Berger (2013) notes an almost total neglect of participatory normative theory in my
book, a criticism that is well taken. Because I started out testing hypotheses derived from deliberative
theory, I did not pay much attention to participatory theory. By political participation, what I meant in

the book was partisan advocacy. In these essays, some authors call it “partisanship” or “partisan
activism”; these variations in terminology seem fine to me, so long as we all agree for purposes of this
conversation that the term “partisanship” need not necessarily be tied to political parties. Partisanship
and partisan activism are suitable synonyms for political advocacy—that is, supporting a controversial
cause, party, or idea of some kind. What makes political advocacy different from involvement in the
garden club, the bowling league, or Toastmasters is that advocacy demands forming opinions and taking
stands on controversial issues. It is, in this sense, inherently unsafe from a social perspective.
The term “civic engagement” is often used to refer to the much broader swath of participation
that includes non-controversial civic involvement such as joining the Rotary Club. Who could object to
someone raising money for scholarships, volunteering to help keep the highways clean, working with
underprivileged youth, and so forth? My point is not that these forms of participation are unimportant,
but rather that they are more attractive to many citizens than partisan engagement particularly because
they are uncontroversially viewed as worthwhile by others. No one risks that others will think ill of her
for working in a soup kitchen or look askance at him for volunteering at the local hospital.
Political advocacy, on the other hand, requires far more courage and more skill to negotiate
effectively in a social environment. Thus, when universities promote civic engagement among their
students, as is common at the moment, apolitical do-gooding is generally what they have in mind:
“giving back” to the community and “getting involved” in helpful ways. As Berger notes in Attention
Deficit Democracy (2011), as well as in his essay in this volume, civic engagement has become a
“confusing catchall” that does not differentiate political, moral and social engagement. I would be very
happy to see the term meet its demise in favor of more specific terms, as Berger recommends. Once a
definition encompasses everything, it becomes of little use for purposes of communication among
scholars, or for purposes of empirical research.
In the research project that led to Hearing the Other Side, participation was merely an
afterthought, which helps explain (though not excuse) the general neglect of participatory theory in the
book. I used measures of participation that happened to be in the data I was analyzing simply because
they were there. I had not anticipated the tension I found between participation and cross-cutting
exposure, and thus had not included as many empirical measures of participation as I might have
otherwise.
All of the participation measures fit under the traditional election oriented definition of political
participation as political advocacy— voting, donating time or money to campaigns, promoting one
candidate over another, displaying bumper stickers, and so forth. Had the participation items instead
tapped the broader kind of activities I call civic engagement above—membership in the Rotary or in
garden clubs, for example—I doubt I would have found the same relationships; outside of competitive
advocacy involving contentious groups, there would be no logical reason for participation to pose risks
to social harmony in people’s relationships. So long as a form of political participation does not generate
any opposition, it should not have potential social costs.
This distinction forms the core of the differences of opinion expressed in these essays. For
example, Simone Chambers (2013) suggests that the participation scale I use is “problematic” and
“voting-centric.” The latter is most certainly true; it included the traditional participation questions that
are asked in election studies. They all involved the advocacy of one side over another in competitions of
people and ideas. Nonpartisan forms of participation should not generate the same tension between
social harmony and a highly participative citizenry because they are not controversial.
But far from being the wrong kind of participation in the context of my study, I continue to think
that partisan participation is precisely the form of participation that should be cause for concern when
we observe that it is engaged in primarily by those who have little cross-cutting exposure. Controversy
and competing ideas are the raison d’être for deliberation. Reason giving and a shared understanding of
differences are most important when there is controversy; it is much less critical to engagements of the
non-controversial sort.

Differentiating Desirable Forms of Participation

Chambers questions whether we really want political activists at the top of a participation scale. I am not
sure what she has in mind instead; perhaps some indicator of the quality of participation? Among
empirical scholars, citizens who participate most actively and energetically are generally held in high
esteem as the “good citizens” of American politics. Chambers (2013, 203) suggests that “low voter
turnout does not necessarily mean lower political participation.” However, empirically speaking, it
usually does mean exactly that. If people do not bother to vote, then it is extremely unlikely that they
will engage in more demanding forms of political participation. Large-scale analyses have demonstrated
time and again that it is not very fruitful to ask a representative sample of Americans about other forms
of political participation because very small percentages of the general population engage in them, and
they are a subset of those who already vote.
Based on these essays, my impression is that theorists are perhaps overly dismissive of partisan
activism and under-concerned about the need to promote it. Instead of valuing this form of
participation, it is presented as an extremely ugly stepsister to the “good” kind of participation. As
Hélène Landemore (2013, 221) suggests, “We need to reinvent democratic institutions in ways that
foster, or are at least compatible with, critical-deliberative involvement rather than partisan activism.”
The intended distinction between critical-deliberative involvement and partisan advocacy is not
entirely clear to me. Partisanship is characterized here as a source of “polarization and groupthink in
segregated groups of citizens” and of “mindless voting.” As Landemore (2013, 223n7) continues, “At its
worst, one might even argue that partisan activism for its own sake (as in ‘voting early,’ no matter how
mindlessly) simply ‘encourages the bastards.’” I am not entirely certain who the bastards are here, but
empirical political science tells us that early voters tend to be extremely well informed as well as very
politically active. Thus, characterizing them as “mindless” simply does not jibe with empirical reality.
If partisan advocacy is the bad kind of participation in the eyes of many theorists, then what is
the better alternative? As Landemore (2013, 218, emph. added) explains further,
What I call “critical-deliberative involvement” consists in participating as an autonomous and reasoning
agent in the life of the community… Critical-deliberative involvement can also consist in acting within
traditionally representative institutions, including by voting in an informed manner. It can mean supporting
parties and political leaders, but in a conditional and mindful way. It can mean running for office, to the
extent that one does not jeopardize one’s moral integrity and independence of judgment. It demands at all
times an acute awareness of the instrumental nature and fallibility of political institutions and an ability to
maintain one’s independence of judgment, even as one looks to opinion and party leaders as sources of
information.

I struggled to understand why partisan activism is regarded so derogatorily whereas “criticaldeliberative involvement” is seen as crucially different. Based on the description above, the difference
lies not in whether participation is through traditional institutions or whether it involves political
parties. Instead, Landemore contrasts “carefully thought-out personal beliefs” against “the instructions
of a party” and emphasizes the importance of autonomy and independence of judgment at several
junctures. However, if one believes that it is fundamentally better for people to make up their minds
autonomously and independently, that is, without being influenced by others, then deliberation would
seem an odd choice as a preferred model of participation. The whole point of deliberative encounters is
for people to influence one another. If they are not going to change one another’s minds, what would be
the point of bringing them together? Deliberation, by definition, involves situations with rampant
potential for social influence.
Instead of changing viewpoints, the point of deliberation could be information acquisition.
Landemore emphasizes that the form of participation she has in mind must occur “in an informed
manner” and in a “mindful way.” But here again, the empirical evidence tells us that partisans are on the
high side of levels of information. From the time scholars began measuring party identification, it has
always been the case that partisans are the most informed segment of the citizenry. They are not voting
mindlessly, at least not relative to their non-partisan compatriots. They are more resistant to influence

from political advertising, more knowledgeable about the reasons for their issue positions and candidate
choices, and more consistently politically involved. What’s not to like?
Perhaps social influence is seen negatively only when it comes from an organized interest group
such as a political party? As Nancy Rosenblum (2008, 321) points out in On The Side of the Angels, making
choices independent of political parties is neither obviously better nor worse; people “sometimes act
independent of parties from good motives, sometimes from bad motives.” Moreover, these days almost
all people are part of organized interests of some kind or other, whether they are cognizant cardcarrying members or not. Members of labor unions, the AARP, the American Legion, and the NAACP are
all part of advocacy groups that try to tell their membership what to do and how to vote. The idea of
citizens forming political opinions in a social vacuum strikes me as not only unrealistic, but normatively
unappealing. So here again, I find it difficult to understand how theorists differentiate “good” from “bad”
participation.
But surely partisans have a negative and polarizing influence on public opinion, as Landemore
suggests? Another reason theorists might want to be more circumspect about discouraging partisan
activism is that by suggesting that “good citizens” are not partisans, theorists risk further marginalizing
all but the most extreme citizens from the political process. If people who care about social harmony are
not involved in politics because they see it as inherently alienating and controversial, then we will
naturally see fewer moderates in positions of political power. Despite the reputation of politics as a “getrich-quick” scheme, it is quite difficult to persuade Americans to run for political office. Any narrowing
of the pool of those willing to be counted as partisan naturally leads to a more extreme pool of potential
candidates.
Interestingly, Mill is cited approvingly as an example of someone who rejects partisan activism
but advocates critical-deliberative involvement. In the positively regarded example provided, Mill is
distributing pamphlets on contraception to churches, an activity that strikes me as an easy example of
political advocacy. But this activity is instead classified by Landemore as the good kind of participation
because it “stemmed from carefully thought-out personal beliefs, not the instructions of a party.” It is
unclear to me if it is the sheer association with political parties that sullies one’s participatory activities,
or if it is because “carefully thought-out personal beliefs” are viewed as being automatically different in
kind from partisan activists’ participation.
Those familiar with the history of empirical evidence about the American electorate may be
surprised to learn that many normative theorists who advocate critical-deliberative participation
believe that partisans’ beliefs and preferences are not as well thought out as those of non-partisans. I
know that I was surprised, because I am not aware of any evidence to support this belief. One might not
agree with the logic of partisans’ preferences, but partisans who would take the time to walk door to
door with pamphlets advocating an issue position have among the most well-developed belief systems,
partisan or otherwise. It has always been the case that the most politically informed Americans are more
partisan; they have opinions and they act on them. As Rosenblum (2008) notes, parties are “the darlings”
of empirical political science but the orphans of political philosophy.
The commentary provided by Robert Y. Shapiro (2013), another empirical scholar, echoes my
own surprise about this particular collision of political theory and empirical political science. As he
points out, it was not long ago that political scientists were pushing for more clearly defined,
ideologically consistent political parties. Nonetheless, my impression is that most of the theorists
writing in this volume would see ideological consistency as a sign of mindless voting. Ironically, then,
only judgments that do not follow a predictable pattern would be seen as independently formed and
well thought out. As demonstrated in the many studies Shapiro reviews, the American public is now
more issue savvy and ideological, and turnout has increased somewhat. Yet theorists are not rushing to
embrace this as a positive development; in fact, it may have occurred precisely because cross-cutting
exposure has declined, and people are increasingly exposed to like-minded views (see Dilliplane 2011).
Ultimately I do not think it is as easy or as desirable as Landemore suggests to separate partyrelated political activism from other forms of political advocacy. Moreover, as an empirical matter it is
difficult to argue that partisanship has no appeal; empirical evidence suggests that parties are essential

to meaningful and effective political action. Parties familiarize citizens with arguments; they help with
the division of labor that makes contemporary politics possible on a large scale. Moreover, true
“independence of judgment” is a myth. No one exists in a social vacuum and we are all influenced by the
views of those around us, whether they are party members, union members, or bowling league
members. In the end, then, how do we judge whether someone’s political participation is the right kind?
Take the particularly egregious example of a hypothetical person who votes for a congressional
candidate he sees as superior to the opposition’s candidate purely because the candidate is of the same
political party. Isn’t this clearly an example of what Landemore sees as negative about party-related
political participation: mindless adherence to a party line? Even in this extreme example, it is possible to
envision such a vote as a highly mindful, strategic action. After all, legislation must be enacted by a
congressional majority. If the voter’s preferred legislation is typically supported by candidates of a given
party, then it is not at all irrational for him to support the inferior candidate if she is a member of that
party.
This leads me to what I see as the crux of the problem, for purposes of furthering a conversation
on this matter between theorists and empiricists. Empiricists naturally seek evidence documenting
whether one form of participation or another is more desirable. Theorists are focused on the processes
by which individuals arrive at political decisions (independently versus with advice from other people
or institutions; with low versus high levels of information; and so forth). The processes themselves are
seldom observable, even to the individuals making the decisions. Whether Mill engaged in political
activism because of “personal beliefs” or because he was influenced by other groups or individuals to
hold those beliefs seems a distinction without a difference. As an advocate of empiricism, Mill would
certainly appreciate the problem; people are not capable of accurately reporting the origins of their own
views, let alone the origins of others’ views.
How, then, can one differentiate desirable from undesirable forms of participation? Should
holding consistent party-line opinions on issues be sufficient evidence of mindless opinion formation?
Because we seldom know the confluence of factors that have affected how any given person ends up
thinking as she does, it seems unwise to single out partisans as having followed undesirable opinionformation processes. And it is worth reiterating that based on this criterion, a person whose political
views were chosen totally at random would top the desirability scale.

What Is Deliberative “Success”?
The same kind of problem can be observed when examining differences of opinion between empiricists
and theorists in judging Deliberative Polls. I was surprised to learn that theorists consider deliberative
polls a “gold standard” for deliberation (Mansbridge 2010). Among empiricists, there is far less
consensus about the existence of evidence of “success.”
What counts as successful deliberation? As I pointed out in my examination of whether
deliberative theory was a falsifiable theory (Mutz 2008), even when changes are observed in participants
it is difficult to know if they are due to deliberation or some other factor, given the many components of
such events (incentives, information, the presence of experts, and so forth). More importantly, there
seems to be little agreement on what the outcome of a successful deliberative poll would look like. If
opinions change, is that a sign of success or failure? If people learn from the expert information
provided, how is this different from the usual top-down, elite-driven process of becoming informed?
And how will those not involved in this endeavor know that they can trust the “expert information” that
was provided or the variable quality of the deliberations’ moderators?
Given that the relatively small sample of people that participates must represent what opinions
in the larger collective would look like if all citizens had deliberated, it also matters how the general
public regards this process and its outcomes. Will those who were not part of the deliberative poll feel
represented by the “considered opinions” of those who did participate? I am constantly asked how
anyone in their right mind can believe that a sample of 1,000 people can represent the views of such a

large nation. Probability theory can explain this, but many remain dubious. Even when they are highly
representative, deliberative poll results have the same legitimacy problems that regular polls do.
But deliberative polls face a potentially much greater legitimacy problem. It seems unlikely that
citizens en masse will rush to embrace the notion that they would have reached the same conclusions as
the deliberators had they been chosen to participate instead of those who were. In fact, they are right to
be skeptical. Interactive processes tend to have results that are far less predictable than is random
sampling. If, for example, we take 1,000 voters from a population, sampling theory tells us that the
percentage who favor an issue will seldom vary from the true percentage by more than a few points.
However, if we sample 1,000 voters, let them deliberate, then poll them, the results might be wildly
different from one random sample to the next. This is because interactive processes such as deliberation
are subject to “historical dependence,” meaning that the result can be greatly affected by chance
occurrences early in the process that set the process moving in a certain direction. Historical
dependence has been well documented in many fields (e.g., Cohen 1976; Arthur 1989), including models
involving mutual persuasion (Clifford and Sudbury 1973). In other words, the outcome of a particular
deliberative poll is highly contingent on events in the early stages of the process, the occurrence of
which would be uncertain in a different iteration of the poll. Thus, deliberative polling does not have
anywhere near the reliability of ordinary polling.

The Tension Between Participation and Cross-Cutting Exposure
Central to my book’s argument is the tension between, on the one hand, people’s need for social
harmony in their interpersonal environments and, on the other, the need for cross-cutting exposure in
order to make balanced political decisions on controversial issues.
One way to alleviate the tension between political advocacy and crosscutting exposure is aptly
illustrated by some of the arguments in these essays. If we simply extend the definition of political
participation beyond political advocacy to include civic engagement in the broad sense of public
involvement of all kinds, then “political participation” poses little threat to people’s interpersonal
relationships. So long as they choose certain noncontroversial forms of civic involvement over partisan
advocacy, there should be no problem making these two ends compatible.
As suggested earlier in this essay, civic engagement serves as an effective means of distancing
one’s self from partisan turmoil while still being publicly involved. Civic engagement need not threaten
social cohesion in the same way political advocacy does. I see the widespread popularity of civicengagement initiatives as symptomatic of a desire for a “way out” for those who do not want to risk
alienating those different from themselves, but who still want to remain civically active. It is not the only
way out, however. Wealthy patrons of political causes may also decide to pursue the initiatives they care
about directly through philanthropy rather than through electing like-minded government officials.
Contributing either time or money to a cause produces less controversy than being actively involved in
partisan politics. Philanthropy allows some to pursue politics by other means (Frumkin 2006).
A second criticism offered in these essays is that I impugn deliberation in the absence of crosscutting exposure, even though most definitions of deliberation require more than such exposure. This is
certainly true; cross-cutting exposure is only one of many components generally required for
deliberation. But as a logical matter, if we agree that crosscutting exposure is necessary for deliberation,
and if we acknowledge that it is the cross-cutting part of the activity that makes deliberation difficult,
then cross-cutting exposure is more than just one of several parts. It is a linchpin if deliberative
democracy is to work in practice, not just in theory. If deliberation as it occurs in everyday life is to
facilitate the ends advocated by normative theorists, then it must incorporate exposure to differing
viewpoints. To the extent that political advocates tend not to have much exposure to alternative points
of view, their participation should be of a lesser quality.
A third, more complex criticism is that in Hearing the Other Side, I unnecessarily demand that
both cross-cutting exposure and political advocacy be incorporated within the same individual. By
suggesting that these are simultaneous responsibilities of the individual, I create a no-win situation,

given that my findings suggest that cross-cutting exposure diminishes the propensity to participate.
Chambers (2013, 199), however, asks (in effect): So what if political activists are not open to hearing the
other side? Both open-minded citizens and partisan activists “make equally important and positive
contributions to deliberative politics when it is viewed as a system that deploys a division of labor.”
According to this line of argument, no single site of deliberation must embody all components so long as
the system as a whole incorporates all necessary elements. So some people can experience cross-cutting
exposure while others actively participate in partisan politics.
This idea is an appealing one (see Mansbridge et al. 2012) because it suggests that the tension
between participation and exposure to crosscutting views can be alleviated through a simple division of
labor; some people will be exposed to differing political views, and others will participate as active
political advocates. One obvious difficulty with this approach is envisioning how the benefits of exposure
to multiple perspectives (tolerance, awareness of others’ perspectives, moderation, and so forth) will be
communicated to the citizens responsible for political advocacy. If they participate in a way that does
not acknowledge alternative viewpoints and dissimilar others’ needs, then their activism may be
counterproductive, exacerbating whatever problems the nonparticipative elements of society had hoped
to solve. Participation that does not advocate on behalf of both parts of this division of labor will not
serve both groups’ interests.
The only scenario in which I can see a division of labor potentially working is if these roles were
randomly assigned to people. If activists reflected the same interests and values, on average, as those
who were inactive, then perhaps it could work, even without the need to transmit to the activists what
was gleaned from exposure to oppositional views. Unfortunately, what we know about those who are
most exposed to oppositional views and those who participate most energetically is that they represent
very different demographic and political profiles. Perhaps there are ways this might work at a system
level that I have yet to envision, but for the moment, I remain skeptical that these different parts of a
larger system would work together to provide the same outcome.

The Future of Hearing the Other Side
I agree with Landemore that the tendency to seek out like-minded others is hardly a recent problem. But
it nonetheless has no easy solution by means of formal deliberative encounters or everyday interactions.
The tendency for people to gravitate toward like-minded others is so basic and pervasive that
apparently one can observe it even in preverbal infants. Babies demonstrate a preference for those who
like the same things they do and hold negative attitudes toward those who do not share their tastes. For
example, if one puppet is shown eating graham crackers and the other Cheerios, then a baby who prefers
Cheerios will select the latter puppet to play with. Even very young babies repeatedly prefer those who
share their tastes in food and clothing. And this tendency extends beyond one-on-one relationships;
infants as young as nine months old prefer individuals who are nice to people like them and who are
mean to people who are not like them (Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom 2007; Hamlin, Mahajan, Liberman, and
Wynn 2013).
As depressing as such findings may be, they tell us something about the nature of similarity
seeking. People may be hardwired to desire communicating with those with similar ideas and tastes, and
it is not likely to be easy to convince them they really want to expose themselves to difference. Exposure
to cross-cutting views happens primarily because people do not have full control of their environments
rather than because they actively choose diversity.
Although I may be overly optimistic, I do not think this means that encouraging cross-cutting
exposure is a lost cause. With respect to the contemporary media environment, I agree with the
excellent reviews provided by Shapiro and Chris Wisniewski (2013). There is no doubt that media choice
has increased for most Americans, and greater choice is unlikely to be used in service of increased cross
cutting exposure. The explosion of channels on cable television has meant that people can avoid politics
altogether; further, they can self-select particular flavors of exposure to politics and avoid much crosscutting exposure if they so choose. I am not naïve enough to think that Americans are ready to

voluntarily give up their hundreds of cable channels in service to the cause of deliberative politics.
Moreover, research published since Hearing the Other Side suggests that exposure to like-minded
television content works in much the same way that interpersonal communication does, as I showed in
my book: It increases some kinds of political participation over time (though not turnout), while
exposure to cross-cutting news depresses participation. As Susanna Dilliplane (2011) summarizes, “the
hypothesized energizing and enervating effects of exposure” also apply to mediated exposure.
Given that the Internet grants its users a tremendous amount of control over what they see and
hear, it should not be terribly surprising that people use it to locate like-minded content. But the
Internet is neither as good for cross-cutting discourse as some predicted, nor as bad as is often claimed
by its detractors. I concur with Wisniewski that there probably has been too much emphasis on issues of
access to the Internet (the so-called digital divide) and not enough on what people do with the Internet
once they have access. The digital divide can conceivably be fixed with time; humanity’s apparent desire
for like-minded exposure is going to be a far harder problem to solve.
So what reasons might there be for optimism amidst such evidence? I can point to two
possibilities. First, contrary to many apocalyptic predictions, things are not quite as bad as one might
think on the media front. For example, the current American political television diet is not so heavily
skewed toward like-minded political content as one might think. News programs without any
recognizable partisan slant remain the most popular with American audiences. This is quite different
from the pattern observed with face-to-face political discussion, where likeminded sources dominate.
Fortunately these “neutral” sources tend to incorporate arguments on multiple sides, as Shapiro notes,
even if it is only for purposes of creating the impression of intense conflict. The fact that Americans still
overwhelming use more neutral than partisan sources contradicts predictions that people would soon
abandon such traditional news for likeminded partisan sources (e.g., Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Sunstein
2007). “Neutral news remains a strong—indeed, the strongest—player in the increasingly competitive
battle for the American news audience” (Dilliplane 2012).
A second source of optimism harks back to Carole Pateman’s (1970) original emphasis on the
importance of the workplace as a democratic training ground, though I deem the workplace important
for somewhat different reasons. The types of interactions my book studied were primarily dyadic
interpersonal interactions that happened in the course of everyday life. I remain convinced that
deliberation must be embedded in the course of people’s daily lives in order to serve the legitimizing
function envisioned by theorists. But based on burgeoning research, I think the American workplace is
in many (though not all) ways the best available public forum.
People work because they need to make a living. We can pick and choose our close friends, but
with many coworkers we must simply get along well enough to get the job done. We have little choice
but to spend long hours together. People’s discussions at work reflect the baseline availability of
partisan opinions, and the majority of workplaces are roughly equally divided among Republicans and
Democrats (Mondak and Mutz 2002a).
As a result, people are more likely to experience cross-cutting political opinions at work than
anywhere else. Although I noted this in passing in Hearing the Other Side, additional data gathered since
that time have further convinced me of the importance of this unique venue. Based on studies of a
number of different kinds of workplaces, it appears that employees are quite accurate in assessing the
political views of their work associates and supervisors. Surprisingly, they do not feel very threatened
by differences of opinion in this context and do not feel that it affects their promotion or employment
prospects. Moreover, they learn quite a bit about the other side simply from listening to others who are
differently minded and are sometimes more interested in politics than they are. Even when one merely
watches and listens, there is a great deal to be gained from spectating (see Green 2010). There are no
paid moderators at work, but people typically hold their tongues and remain respectful so that they can
continue to work in harmony alongside their colleagues (Mondak and Mutz 2002b).
The intensely social atmosphere in most workplaces creates spillover effects that increase the
size of people’s networks. Even more important, the workplace has been one of the most successful sites
for racial and ethnic integration. As Cynthia Estlund (2003, 61) puts it, “people from different racial and

ethnic groups—while often continuing to live, go to school, and worship in separate social spaces—
increasingly work together.” The workplace is a unique domain in which people experience lengthy and
ongoing interactions with people with whom they would not otherwise choose to associate. It is, in this
sense, an “involuntary association,” one that eludes the problems of self-selection.
Of course, it remains to be seen if this uniquely integrative social context will be harnessed
toward deliberative ends. At the moment, the workplace remains one of the few venues where close
social interaction is combined with political heterogeneity, thus giving it tremendous unrealized
potential (Mondak and Mutz 2002a). Although the workplace is not currently recognized as a public
forum, and political speech is not protected in private workplaces, the majority of Americans think that
it is (Mondak and Mutz 2002b). For now, this may make them more willing to engage in political talk
around the water cooler than they would otherwise. In the long run, the civic potential of the American
workplace is something that will need to be fostered and protected if it is to serve the purpose of
encouraging cross-cutting political exposure.
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